Despite financial innovations that have created important new substitutes for cash usage, per capita holdings of U.S. currency amount to $2950. Yet American households and businesses admit to holding only 15 percent of the currency stock, leaving the whereabouts of 85 percent unknown. Some fraction of this unaccounted for currency is held abroad (the dollarization hypothesis) and some is held domestically undeclared, as a store of value and a medium of exchange for transactions involving the production and distribution of illegal goods and services, and for transactions earning income that is not reported to the IRS (the unreported economy hypothesis).
currency in circulation with the public 2 had risen to $920 billion dollars, amounting to $2950 for every man, woman and child in the country. Over the past decades we have witnessed a host of cash-saving financial innovations, leading to widespread predictions of the advent of a "cashless society". But contrary to these expectations, the demand for U.S. dollars continues to rise and we remain awash in cash. Over the last twenty years, real per capita currency holdings increased by 79 percent and currency as a fraction of the M1 money supply rose from 30 percent to 49 percent.
To put these figures in perspective, they imply that the average American"s bulging wallet holds 91 pieces of U.S. paper currency, consisting of: 31 one dollar bills; 7 fives; 5 tens; 21 twenties; 4 fifties and 23 one hundred dollar bills. Few of us will recognize ourselves as "average" citizens. Clearly, these amounts of currency are not normally necessary for those of us simply wishing to make payments when neither credit/debit cards nor checks are accepted or convenient to use.
Federal Reserve surveys (Avery et al. , 1987 of household currency usage found that U.S. residents admitted to holding less than 10 percent of the nation"s currency supply. Businesses (Anderson, 1977; Sumner, 1990) admitted to holding 5 percent. It seems that the whereabouts of roughly 85 percent of the nation"s currency supply is unknown. This anomalous finding suggests that the "currency enigma" (Feige 1989 (Feige , 1994 and the problem of "missing currency" (Sprenkel, 1993) is still very much with us.
1 Professor Emeritus, Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison. elfeige@wisc.edu. Thanks to Dan Feenberg, Ruth Judson, Richard Anderson and Mark Ledbetter for generously providing data employed in the study. 2 The currency data used throughout the paper refers to the currency component of the M1 money supply defined as currency outside U.S. Treasury, Federal Reserve Banks and the vaults of depository institutions.
(Not seasonally adjusted). (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h6/hist/h6hist4.pdf) . The "currency outside banks" series from the Flow Of Funds Accounts of the United States Z.1 (Table L 204 , line 6) (not seasonally adjusted) is typically somewhat larger than the currency component series.
The currency enigma has both a stock and a flow dimension. First we must determine who holds the outstanding stock of U.S. cash. Specifically, how much of this currency is abroad, (the dollarization hypothesis) and how much is held domestically (the underground economy hypothesis) by citizens reluctant to admit to their true cash holdings? The flow issue concerns the amount of cash payments sustained by that missing currency. If half of the missing currency is hoarded and the other half is used as a medium of exchange, turning over at an average velocity of between 30 and 50 transactions per year, (Feige, 1989a ) the missing circulating currency stock would give rise to a flow of "missing payments" of an order of magnitude comparable to the entire GNP of the United States.
The location of America"s currency stock and the frequency of its use (currency turnover or velocity) have important implications for a variety of economic issues. If a large fraction of U.S. currency is held abroad, U.S. citizens derive considerable benefit from seigniorage, since the U.S. government effectively obtains an interest free loan from foreign citizens holding U.S. dollars. U.S. dollars have historically been perceived to have many desirable properties that made them attractive to both domestic and foreign holders. As a relatively stable currency the dollar functioned as a safe and portable store of value, reducing user"s risks of bank failures, devaluations and inflation. As an anonymous and widely accepted means of payment that left no paper trail, U.S. cash was a preferred medium of exchange for "underground" transactions. More recently, the growing popularity of the Euro and the rapid development of transition economies may have weakened overseas demand for U.S. dollars as a second currency, thereby reducing our overseas seigniorage earnings.
From the perspective of conducting domestic monetary policy, the relevant monetary aggregates to consider are the domestic money supply and the domestic monetary base (Feige, 1994) . In order to determine the domestic monetary aggregates, the Federal Reserve needs to know what fraction of U.S. currency is held abroad and the annual net outflow of U.S. currency going abroad. Similarly, foreign monetary authorities need to know the extent to which their nations are "de facto dollarized" (Feige, 2003) , and the magnitude of net inflows of foreign currencies into their economies. De facto dollarization reduces the effectiveness of exchange rate stabilization policies and reduces seigniorage revenues.
The whereabouts of America"s cash also has fiscal consequences. U.S. currency is a preferred medium of exchange for facilitating clandestine transactions, and for storing illicit and untaxed wealth. Knowledge of its location and usage is required to estimate the origins and volume of illicit transactions. These include the illegal trade in drugs, arms and sex as well as the amount of "unreported" income, that is, income not properly reported to the fiscal authorities due to noncompliance with the tax code. The fiscal revenue lost to the government creates a "tax gap" that measures the extent to which taxpayers do not file their tax returns and pay the correct tax in a timely manner. Tax evasion gains increasing importance at a time of severe fiscal deficits that could be reduced by improved tax compliance.
In short, our understanding of a number of key monetary and fiscal issues depends upon the answer to a single empirical question, namely, what fraction of the U.S.
currency supply is held abroad? It is to this question and its implications that we now turn. Section 1 examines the evolution of the U.S. currency stock and changes in its denomination structure over time. Section 2 reviews the empirical controversy over the amount of U.S. currency held abroad, and presents new time series estimates of the fraction of U.S. currency held overseas. Section 3 reviews and evaluates the direct data sources bearing on the inflow and outflow of currency to and from the U.S. and reviews the methods used to obtain the official Federal Reserve"s Flow of Funds statistics and the Bureau of Economic Analysis" data on currency flows abroad. Section 4 reviews the state of our knowledge concerning the specific location of U.S. dollars overseas. Section 5 examines the implications of overseas currency holdings for seigniorage earnings and Section 6 employs improved estimates of domestic monetary aggregates to examine their predictive power in explaining fluctuations in inflation and real output. Section 7 utilizes the latest estimates of the domestic currency supply to calculate the size and growth of the "unreported" economy in the U.S. and provides fiscal estimates of the "tax gap". The final section summarizes the implications of our findings.
1) The Evolution of Cash and its Denomination Structure
Financial innovation creates many substitutes for cash. Credit and debit cards, electronic payments, EZ pass transponders on toll roads, and pre-paid phone cards are common examples. Yet all predictions concerning the advent of a "cashless" society have proven false as evidenced by the evolution of U.S. currency held by the public between 1964 and 2010.
As shown in Figure 1 , U.S. cash holdings of the public increased from $35 billion in 1964 to $920 billion by the end of 2010. Moreover, real per capita cash holdings which remained roughly stable over the first twenty year period more than doubled during the most recent twenty five years.
An examination of the evolution of the denomination structure of currency 2010. This radical change in the denomination structure might be expected to result from changes in the consumer price index which increased seven fold over the past 45 years. Figure 3 depicts the real value of currency held by the public in different denominations. The real value of smaller denomination notes remained roughly constant with a slight rise in the holdings of the $50 notes. However, the real holdings of $100 bills increased fifteen fold during this period. The $100 bill is often used as a store of value although its efficacy as a store of value has declined due to inflation. Nevertheless, the demand for $100 bills continued to rise in both nominal and real terms. One possible explanation is the "dollarization" hypothesis, (Feige, 2003; 2004) suggesting that U.S. currency, and particularly $100 bills are widely demanded as a second currency in foreign countries experiencing banking crises, political instability and/or hyperinflations.
An alternative source of cash demand arises from its use as a medium of exchange and store of value in the "underground" economy. Since cash usage is anonymous, without leaving a paper trail, it is the preferred medium for purchasing illegal goods and services and for hiding income that should be, but is not reported to the tax authority. The problem then is to determine what fraction of the U.S. currency supply is held abroad and what fraction is held domestically, albeit somewhat clandestinely.
2) The controversy over the location of U.S. currency.
Research in the early nineties witnessed a number of studies attempting to estimate the fraction of U.S. currency held abroad, resulting in an empirical controversy that persists to this day. Examining direct data sources 3 on net outflows of U.S. currency (Feige, 1994) , and indirect methods, (variants of monetary demography models) Feige (1996) concluded "that roughly 36 percent of U.S. currency is held abroad". Since alternative methods of estimating overseas currency holdings yielded a varied results, Feige (1997) suggested that the most plausible range of estimates was between 25-45 percent. Doyle (2000) subsequently estimated that in 1995, 30 percent of U.S. currency was held abroad.
Very different results were obtained by Porter and Judson (1996) , whose indirect "seasonal" method estimated the share of currency held abroad, to be 70 percent. Taking account of alternative estimation methods, Porter and Judson reported a "median flow estimate" for 1995 of 55 percent abroad, similar to the estimate produced by Anderson and Rasche (1997) concern is the huge $264 billion discrepancy between Goldberg"s (2010) estimate of currency abroad and the Board of Governors FOF estimate.
In light of these unsettlingly divergent estimates, we review the main data sources employed to determine the amount of U.S. currency held abroad. Our aim is to review earlier research results; explain the recent dramatic revisions adopted by both the Bureau of Economic Analysis 8 and the Federal Reserve 9 in their officially published estimates of currency held abroad; and to suggest how the long standing controversy over the true fraction of U.S. currency held abroad might be more readily resolved.
3) Direct data sources of currency inflows and outflows
The most direct method for estimating the faction of currency held abroad relies upon data systems designed to track currency outflows and inflows to and from abroad. 11 Both of these data systems are described, compared and evaluated in Feige (1996 Feige ( , 1997 or guest workers. They may also exclude some currency shipments into or out of the country by non reporting shipping entities. Nevertheless, these data currently represent an informative (if at times imperfect) record 12 of currency inflows and outflows, and are invaluable for determining the geographic destination of cash shipments and the origins of cash receipts from overseas locations. Unfortunately, researchers have been denied access to the data for the last decade despite the fact that aggregation techniques (Feige and Watts, 1972) are readily available to overcome confidentiality concerns. Most recently, economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (Hellerstein and Ryan, 2011 , displayed graphs of aggregate monthly currency payments and receipts based on these NYB data for the period 1990-2007 but the underlying data were withheld on claims of confidentiality.
b) The FR-160 Proxy
In an effort to avoid the confidentiality restrictions that have prevented direct publication of the NYB data for the past two decades, Feige (1994) initially proposed using a proxy for these confidential data based on the Federal Reserve"s FR-160 cash accounting system. 13 The FR-160 reports contain monthly data on denomination specific flows of currency paid into circulation (PIC) and received from circulation (RFC) for each of the 37 Federal Reserve cash offices. Net injections (PIC-RFC) of $100 denomination bills by the New York Federal Reserve cash office (NYNET) were found to be so highly correlated with the internal confidential New York Fed"s series on aggregate bulk shipments that they were initially accepted as a serviceable proxy for the NYB series of net currency shipments abroad. 14 Subsequent investigation led Feige (1996) to warn that the NYNET proxy overstated true net outflows. 15 Recognizing that shipments and receipts of currency to and from Asian markets often originated at the Los Angeles cash office of the Federal Reserve, the Board of Governors of the Federal 12 In 2003, the Federal Reserve terminated its Extended Custodial Inventory (ECI) agreement with UBS and in 2004 followed with a $100 million civil penalty after discovering that UBS had falsified its reports of overseas shipments to the Federal Reserve over an eight year period. (Pasley, 2005) 13 The historical background and evolution of the FR-160 reporting system is contained in the Board of Governors technical memorandum #91 entitled " Processing Procedures for the Cash Series", November, 1988. 14 Feige, 1994 . 15 Feige, 1996, pp. 43-45. Reserve Figure 4 for the years 1974-2010.
The official NYLA proxy was understood to have several shortcomings. It overstated net shipments abroad to the extent that some of the net injections of $100 bills represented domestic demand for those bills in the NY and LA districts. Moreover, the NYLA proxy took no account of net cash inflows from Latin America that were likely to appear in cash offices located in the southern U.S. border states. The proxy understated 16 Bach ,1997. 18 By way of comparison, during the same eighteen year period, the official NYLAM proxy estimated that $241 billion had been shipped abroad whereas our proposed NYLAMSAELJ proxy estimated that $199 billion has been shipped abroad. Our tentative conclusion is that even the current "official"
estimates of overseas currency are overstated and it is most likely that considerably less than 30 percent of U.S. currency is presently abroad.
c) Currency and Monetary Instrument Reports
As part of its regulatory responsibility under the Currency and Foreign
Transactions Reporting Act, the U.S. Customs Service collects information on U.S. wholesale currency shipments data in order to arrive at more reliable estimates of the true fraction of currency abroad as well as the country specific location of U.S. currency balances.
The most significant conclusion resulting from our review of direct measures of overseas currency is that far less currency appears to be circulating overseas than was previously thought to be the case. Moreover, they suggest that the past decade has witnessed a significant decline in the rest of the world"s demand for U.S. currency. If true, domestic currency holdings must have increased even more rapidly than implied by Figure 7 .
4) The Location of U.S. Currency Held Abroad
Two sources of data are available for estimating the location of U.S. dollars Table 3 .3] and are reproduced here in Table 2 .
Unfortunately, the Treasury Report gives no indication of the method employed to obtain these "survey" estimates other than to obliquely state in a footnote: "For currency holdings, estimates were provided during the teams visit to each country and thus are estimates as of the most recent trip to each country". 24 Table 2 Figure 8 for both regions are likely to be overstated.
5) Seigniorage
The Federal Reserve supplies currency on demand to both domestic and foreign customers willing to hold the non-interest bearing obligations of the U.S. central bank.
The Federal Reserve earns seigniorage income when it uses these interest free proceeds to acquire interest bearing assets. After subtracting the costs of operating the currency system, the Federal Reserve remits the bulk of its annual interest earnings to the U.S.
Treasury. The widespread circulation of U.S. banknotes abroad and their near universal acceptance as a medium of exchange makes America"s currency an attractive target for counterfeiting. Judson and Porter (2010) estimate that the stock of counterfeits in the world as a whole is likely to be of the order of 1 per 10,000 of genuine notes ($20-$30 million in value terms) and no greater than 3 in 10,000 ($120-$220 million in value terms). These finding suggest that counterfeiting costs to the U.S. taxpayer are very small compared to the seigniorage earnings from abroad.
6) The Money, Output, Inflation Controversy
The stability and information content of the relationship between monetary aggregates and real output and inflation has been the subject of considerable controversy in macroeconomics since Sims (1972) discovered a unidirectional causality from money and income. Feige and Pearce (1979) showed that this empirical finding was highly sensitive to alternative specifications and concluded that "the relationship between money and income appears to be casual rather than causal."
As time series analysis became more sophisticated, Friedman and Kuttner (1992) reexamined the relationship between monetary aggregates and real income and prices in a 
where Δy, Δp, and Δm are respectively, the quarterly growth rates of real output, inflation and alternative monetary aggregates.
25 Table 3 presents the p-values of the Granger causality -square statistics computed with White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. The null hypothesis is that all coefficients on the lagged financial variables, considered individually in the autoregressive specifications, are zero. Table 3 is similar to the presentation in Aksoy and Piskorski (2006) who used the earlier estimates of domestic currency based on the NYLA proxy for foreign holdings described in Section 2 above.
Our estimates of domestic currency holdings are derived from the newly revised official BEA/FED estimates of foreign holdings based on the NYLAM proxy, and on our proposed NYLAMSAELJ proxy. Additionally, we examine estimates of the M1, M2, and MB aggregates corrected for alternative estimates of domestic currency holdings. Our findings, covering a longer time period, and revised estimates of the domestic currency component, confirm the Askoy and Piskorski (2006) results that domestic currency has significant predictive content for both real output and inflation. However, with the exception of the domestic M1 money supply in the inflation equation, none of the other domestic monetary aggregates appear to have significant predictive content for either real output or inflation.
7) Implications for the Unreported Economy and the Tax Gap
The foregoing estimates of the domestic currency supply are now employed to generate a time series estimates of the relative size of the unreported economy which reflects tax evasion activity in the U.S. We focus our discussion on the estimation of "unreported income" (Yu), namely the difference between the total amount of income that should be reported to the tax authority (Y T ) (under full compliance with the tax code) and the amount actually reported (Yo), namely, adjusted gross income (AGI). The most common method for estimating the relative size of the unreported economy relies on some variant of the general currency ratio (GCR) model described in Feige (1986; 1989) .
The most restrictive specifications of the currency ratio model [Cagan (1958) , Gutmann (1977) ] assume that currency is the exclusive medium of exchange for unreported transactions, that the ratio of currency to checkable deposits remains constant except for changes induced by the growth of unreported income and that the amount of unreported income produced by a dollar of currency transacted in the unreported sector is the same as the amount of reported income produced by a dollar of currency transacted in the reported economy. In order to obtain a benchmark estimate of the size of the unreported sector, the restrictive model also assumes that in some benchmark year (1940), unreported income is zero.
26
As described in greater detail in Cebula and Feige (2012) , we refine the restrictive GCR model by relaxing some of its key assumptions. First we substitute our estimate of domestic currency in circulation (C dom ) for the total amount of currency in circulation (C) since currency held abroad does not reflect tax evasion activity in the U.S. Second we account for a major technological innovation in the financial industry (the introduction of sweep accounts) which reduced the volume of "checkable deposits" (D) in a manner totally unrelated to behavior in the unreported economy. Figure 10 displays the effects of these two adjustments by comparing the conventional C/D ratio employed in many published estimates of the "underground"
26 As described in Feige (1989) and Cebula and Feige (2012) these restrictions imply that the ratio of unreported income (Yu) to reported income( Yo) can be estimated as follows: Yu/Yo =(C-koD)/ (ko+1) D: where C = Currency, D= Checkable deposits and ko= (Co/Do), the currency deposit ratio in the official economy which is observed in the year (1940) Slemrod (2007, p.26) 30 IRS (1983) 400 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 unreported income amounted to $1.9 -2.4 trillion, giving rise to a tax gap of roughly $400-$550 billion. While these estimates relax several of the key assumptions usually associated with the currency demand approach, they remain quite sensitive to alternative specifying assumptions.
8) Summary and Conclusions
Financial innovations have created major substitutes for currency, yet per capita holdings of U.S. currency in circulation outside of the banking system amount to $2950. Some fraction of the currency is believed to be held abroad in nations whose citizens and businesses feel it prudent to employ U.S. currency as a substitute for their own national currencies as both a medium of exchange and as a store of value. Evidence has been brought to bear (Table 2) that extensive "dollarization" occurred, primarily in Russia, Argentina and China, but the percentage of the U.S. currency supply believed to be held abroad remains in dispute. Porter and Judson (1996) pertaining to wholesale bulk currency shipments abroad. Indeed, the yet to be fully disclosed, (NYB) data 33 suggests that the percent of currency abroad may be substantially lower than the current (FOF/BEA) estimate and implies that the demand for U.S. dollars has declined quite precipitously during the past decade. Hopefully, the New York Federal
Reserve will make these important data concerning overseas currency flows readily available, so that researchers can more accurately determine both the amount of currency abroad and its likely location. Aggregation procedures are available that can satisfy confidentiality requirements without compromising the information content of this important data source.
Taking the current official FOF/BEA data at face value implies that seigniorage earnings from abroad are considerably smaller than is usually presumed and that the demand for dollars from abroad has declined relative to the domestic demand for U.S.
currency. Domestic per capita holdings of U.S. currency are now roughly $1900 and the overwhelming portion of these holdings are in the form of $100 bills that are used both as a store of value and as a medium of exchange. The dramatic growth in real per capita domestic currency holdings flies in the face of widespread predictions of the emergence of a "cashless" society. One partial explanation (Jankowski et. al., 2007) for the increase in domestic currency demand is the rapid growth in the number of Latin American immigrants who encounter barriers to participation in the mainstream financial system. Domestic currency is also known to be the preferred medium of exchange for transactions that individuals and businesses wish to conceal. Such transactions include:
the production and distribution of illegal goods (drugs) and services (prostitution); and incomes earned that are not reported to the fiscal authority in order to evade taxes. In order to examine this "underground" economy hypothesis, we employ a modified currency ratio model to estimate both the volume of "unreported income" and the "tax gap" resulting from this underreporting. Our findings suggest that by 2010, unreported income amounted to $1.9-$2.4 trillion resulting in a "tax gap" ranging from $400 to $550 billion per year. Currently, we estimate that 18-24 percent of total reportable income is not properly reported to the IRS. Despite several key refinements of the traditional currency ratio models, these estimates remain highly sensitive to alternative specifications 34 and estimates of overseas cash holdings. 
